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Introduction
The so-called ‘quality chasm’ has been documented
across the spectrum of health care.1 While outpatient
settings have, to date, received comparatively little
attention, some estimates suggest that they are at least
as important as hospital settings in terms of the burden of
errors and harm. There may be as many as 200 000
avoidable deaths per year attributable to ambulatory
care in the USA.2,3 Primary care physicians, who
ABSTRACT
Evidence suggests that the quality of care delivered
by the healthcare industry currently falls far short of
its capabilities. Whilst most patient safety and
quality improvement work to date has focused on
inpatient settings, some estimates suggest that out-
patient settings are equally important, with up to
200 000 avoidable deaths annually in the United
States of America (USA) alone.
There is currently a need for improved error
reporting and taxonomy systems that are useful at
the point of care. This provides an opportunity to
harness the beneﬁts of computer visualisation to
help structure and illustrate the ‘stories’ behind
errors.
In this paper we present a concept for a visual
taxonomy of errors, based on visual models of the
healthcare system at both macrosystem and micro-
system levels (previously published in this journal),
and describe how this could be used to create a
visual database of errors. In an alphatest in a US
context, we were able to code a sample of 20 errors
from an existing error database using the visual
taxonomy.
The approach is designed to capture and dis-
seminate patient safety information in an unam-
biguous format that is useful to all members of the
healthcare team (including the patient) at the point
of care as well as at the policy-making level.
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provide the vast majority of medical care, are strug-
gling to provide the quality of care that they have been
trained to provide. They are working harder under the
pressures of increasing overheads, competing demands
and decreasing rewards in an unpredictable environ-
ment (especially related to health insurance and mal-
practice).4–6 This environment inhibits eﬀorts to
improve safety and quality.
Error reporting, as part of a blame-free culture of
safety, is an activity that has great potential to yield
valuable insights leading to system improvement.7
Reporting systems need to be safe (that is, free from
blame), easy and worthwhile.8,9 Error reports can be
useful at various levels. At regional, national and
international levels, the ability to collate large num-
bers of reports is very important as it provides the
ability to generate summary statistics (protecting the
conﬁdentiality of individual reporters and institutions)
that can reveal widespread systemic weaknesses that
can informpolicy.10 In theUSA, legislationwill help to
protect these data from medicolegal discovery.11
On the other hand, at the individual oﬃce level,
individual physicians may perceive that generalisations
made about national data, for example, do not apply
to them because of their own unique circumstances
(such as their patient population, their systems of care,
and other local factors). In both theUSA and theUnited
Kingdom, there are calls for making quality and safety
information useful at the point of care, and providing
feedback on speciﬁc safety incidents.12,13
The purpose of the work described in this paper was
to develop and test a concept for a visual medical error
taxonomy that can provide for both policy-level and
oﬃce-level needs. Figure 1 depicts the overall concept
in which error reporting at the oﬃce level is used
internally for safety improvement as well as being
fed seamlessly to a regional, national or international
database that is used to study the epidemiology of
errors and to generate alerts.
Error taxonomies
The term ‘taxonomy’ originally referred to the art and
science of organisation/categorisation/classiﬁcation
of organisms. Now this term is applied in a much wider
and more general sense and is used for classiﬁcations
of objects, processes and events (as well as images and
networks),14 in addition to the principles underlying
these classiﬁcations. Classiﬁcation is performed ac-
cording to a predetermined system. A good taxonomy
takes into account the importance of separating ele-
ments of a group (for example, the microsystem of a
particular health setting) into subgroups (such as the
entities and agents and their interactions within a
microsystem). Groupings should be mutually exclusive
and unambiguous. A good taxonomy that can be
useful at the point of care and at the policy-making
level should be simple, easy to recall and easy to use.
In the context of error reports our functional
deﬁnition of taxonomy is ‘Classiﬁcation of reported
errors with respect to healthcare domains (such as
primary careoﬃce), process of care (for example, patient
assessment), sub-processes (for example, history-taking),
agents/entities (such as providers/doctors), interac-
tions between agents (such as communication between
doctor and patient), consequences, and severity’. This
deﬁnition reﬂects the hierarchical relationships from
Figure 1 Overview of the concept for visual taxonomy and reporting
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the macro-level to micro-levels of the healthcare
system.
Various organisations, including the US Institute
of Medicine (IOM)15 and the World Health Organ-
ization (WHO)16 have recognised the need for error
event taxonomy development, and a number of such
taxonomies have been and are being developed to
organise and classify medical error reports. The Inter-
nationalPrimaryCarePatient SafetyTaxonomySteering
Committee has set itself the ambitious goal of devel-
oping ‘... a primary care taxonomy for patient safety,
embedded in the International Classiﬁcation of Primary
Care (ICPC-2) and in an episode of care structure, that
can operate across settings and vendors, and thatmaps
to other standards and data structures.’17
Current taxonomies are essentially alphanumeric
codes that are used to classify and summarise error
data so as to communicate information about errors
and their characteristics (including causative factors,
consequences and severity), estimate frequencies and
trends of various error types, and identify needs for
safety improvement. Examples include the Applied
Strategies for Improving Patient Safety (ASIPS) Collab-
orative Dimensions ofMedical Outcome taxonomy,18
the American Academy of Family Physicians Taxonomy
of Threats to Patient Safety in Primary Care,19,20 the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare
Organizations (JCAHO) Patient Safety Event Taxon-
omy,21 and the Australian Patient Safety Foundation
Advanced Incident Management System.22 While such
taxonomies have been used successfully in primary
care, they have some limitations:
. the coding systems are complex, labour-intensive,
and prone to ambiguity
. they do not readily meet the point-of-care needs of
patients and health providers to understand, within
their uniquemicrosystems, the causes, cascades and
consequences of reported errors
. they do not fully capture the ‘story’. By reducing an
incident to a series of codes, the ﬂavour of the event
is lost. It is the ‘story’ that has the greatest potential
to contribute to safety improvements8,23
. they often diﬀer in the way they deﬁne, count and
track events, using diﬀerent terms, data, coding
methods and analysis. This contributes to ambiguity
and makes it diﬃcult to compare data that have
been collected or coded using diﬀerent taxonomies.
The USA is developing a National Health Information
Infrastructure that, according to the IOM,15 must
provide information ﬂow across three dimensions:
(1) personal health, to support individuals in their
own wellness and health decision making; (2) health
care providers (the oﬃce level), to ensure access to
clinical decision support systems; and (3) public health
(the policy level), to address and track public health
concerns and health education campaigns. Use of con-
sistent error taxonomy across these dimensions, or
levels, is imperative.
Visualisation
The need for consistent and unambiguous error
taxonomy and for ﬂow of information across these
levels presents an opportunity to harness the beneﬁts
of computer visualisation. Visualisation can help to
structure and illustrate the ‘story’ of an error or event.
Visualisation is a universal tool that furnishes a
natural common ‘language’. For instance, it is used
eﬀectively for international road signs. It can provide:
. a fast path to fully engaging theminds of individuals
and their teams
. insight into causes, cascades and consequences of
errors
. a common vision for teamwork and shared under-
standing of the concepts, with the potential for
improved outcomes
. aid for copingwith the complexities, fragmentation,
and decentralisation of the healthcare system7 and
. an aid for mapping across diﬀerent taxonomies and
data structures.24
Applying a systems engineering/management ap-
proach, the authors have developed visual models at
microsystem and macrosystem levels.25
Macrosystem model
This is a high-level view of health care, with attention
to transitions of care (see Figure 2). As previously
described in this journal,25 care is portrayed in a
cyclical fashion as a series of processes from Assess-
ment to Plan to Implementation, Feedback, Review
and back to Assessment again. These processes take
place in various domains that are depicted by concen-
tric circles starting from the patient level (circle 0) at
the centre, to international health authorities such as
WHO (circle n) on the outside. Oﬃce-based primary
care is represented by circle 1. Depending on the
system under study, circle 2 might represent the
emergency room and circle 3 might represent the
hospital inpatient setting, and so on. This model
allows distinction between the domains that are
internal as well as external to the healthcare system.
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Microsystem models
These are close-up views of the system. For example,
one may devise a microsystem model for a speciﬁc
domainwithin themacrosystem, or for a speciﬁcprocess
within a domain. These models show how the various
entities/agents in the microsystem interact. The level
of detail represented in a micromodel depends on the
purpose for which it is used.
Figure 3 is an example of a microsystem model for
the process of feedback of routine laboratory results.
The diagram depicts the entities involved (doctor,
patient, nurse, medical record, and so on) and the
interactions that take place between them. Each inter-
action is shown as an arrow. Errors or safety problems
can originate at any, or at multiple points within the
system. Lists of errors at speciﬁc points within a
microsystem can be generated through a combination
of literature review and consultation with members of
such microsystems. Using this approach, we have
previously generated a set of 145 types and causes of
errors across the range of entities/agents and their
interactions in the primary care oﬃce setting.26
Figure 2 Macrosystem model of health care25
Figure 3 An example of a microsystem model
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The macrosystem and microsystem diagrams are
computerised and contain hyperlinks that facilitate
hierarchical linkage between models and can be used
for dynamic data links within databases. For example,
any point on the microsystem model can be linked
electronically to a table containing relevant data about
errors that are known to occur at that point in the
system, with details of frequency and consequences of
these errors as well as corrective action recommended
or used.
Thesemacro- andmicrosystemmodels can provide
various functions that we have described elsewhere.25
In this paper, we will describe how a visual taxonomy
based on these models can be used to create a visual
database of errors.
A visual database of errors
Table 1 shows an example of an error and how it could
be coded using the aforementioned ASIPS taxonomy.
Much work has been done around the globe to create
databases of reported errors, coded using taxonomies
of this kind. To help make the information in such
databasesmore accessible to users, we propose that the
information contained therein be represented using
the visual models described above. In other words, we
propose the creation of a visual taxonomy.
The proposed visual taxonomy is coded at four
main levels, corresponding to the structure of the
visual models:
. healthcare domain or transitions between domains
. process
. sub-process
. entity or interaction between entities.
A reported event can consist of one or more errors,
together with causes and consequences. Each of these
can be coded at the above four levels.
To alphatest the feasibility of this approach, we
accessed a random sample of 20 events from theASIPS
database18 and attempted to code them using the visual
taxonomy. All 20 events were successfully coded,
although some minor enrichments of the existing
model were required to accommodate some of the
errors. In this manner a visual database was created.
Table 1 Example event coded in ASIPS taxonomy
Event description Doctor orders a Stat D-Dimer lab test on Friday for a patient with suspected deep
venous thrombosis (DVT), but the lab does not call with the results over the weekend and the doctor
does not follow up. The results are found on Monday to be positive and so the patient is sent to the
Emergency Department where she is found to have a DVT, is treated appropriately, and does well.
Event coded in ASIPS Taxonomy
A Error types
L 1.3.3.1 Failure to report test results in a timely manner
1.5.2.4 Failure of communication between provider and laboratory
B Action taken
2.7 ED visit recommended
C Consequences
1.1.7 Delay in care
D1 Severity of harm
2.2 Error reached the patient but did not cause harm
D2 Harm
3 No change in patient status
E Contributing factors
2.5.7.4 Provider failure to check results
4.1.5 No, unclear, or unknown protocol for task
6.3.9.1 Inadequate system for tracking test specimens/results
7.1.5 End-of-week patient
F Preventive strategies oﬀered by reporter
1.1.6.1 Quicker return of investigation results
1.1.1 More diligence by physician
R Singh, W Pace, S Singh et al226
Figure 4 illustrates some of the screen views, show-
ing ﬁrst how a user might navigate the visual database.
Starting with panel 1, at the top left-hand corner, the
user selects the domain of interest, in this case the
Oﬃce Domain. The user then sees this domain in more
detail – the ﬁvemain processes aremarked around the
circle and thenumberof eventsoccurring in eachprocess
is shown (panel 2).We can see that among the 20 events
that we coded, most occurred in either Implementation
or Feedback. Supposing that the user is interested in the
Feedback process, he/she now clicks on that process and
is shown a list of sub-processes (panel 3). In this case,
these sub-processes are various types of Feedback. Again,
the frequency of events is shown; within this sample of
Figure 4 Interface for visual error database
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20 events, feedback of routine lab results is the most
frequent problemwithin Feedback. If we are interested
in this sub-process, we can click on it and see the
relevant microsystem model. This particular model
(panel 4) describes the feedback of routine lab and
radiology results. On this diagram, next to each entity
and interaction, where relevant, is the number of
errors that were reported involving that entity or
interaction. It is important to note that this is the
number of errors not events, since events often involve
more than one error.
For example, if we are also interested in the feedback
of STAT (that is, urgent) lab test results, we can view
this microsystem’s model instead (panel 5). In this
diagram it can be seen that the system for obtaining
results of STAT lab results involves the lab contacting
the answering service which then contacts the pro-
vider. In addition, the provider has the ability to
contact the lab directly to obtain the result; theywould
typically do this if they did not receive the result within
the expected time. Again, the error frequencies are
shown next to the relevant entities and interactions.
Two errors occurred in the interaction from the pro-
vider to the lab, meaning that the provider did not call
the lab for the results. Clicking on this shows, in
narrative form, the details of the events in which these
errors occurred (on panel 6, we see only one of the
events).
Finally, we can view the details of an event (in this
case event no. 101) in detail in the visual form,
including the error(s) that occurred, the causative
factors, cascades (where relevant) and consequences.
Panel 7 of Figure 4 shows that this event involved two
errors. In this case, the errors were: (a) the laboratory
failed to contact the answering service; and (b) as we
saw earlier, the physician failed to contact the labora-
tory to pursue the result.
Next, we can view the contributing factors (panel 8).
These are portrayed on the same diagram. As before,
pointing to the highlighted area will tell the user what
the contributing factor was at that point in the micro-
system. Cascades of errors and consequences of errors
can be visualised in the same way.
Discussion
We are proposing a novel approach, based on com-
puterised visual models of the healthcare system, to
facilitate the summarisation and dissemination of
information about medical errors in primary care.
The purpose is to make information about medical
errors useful both at the oﬃce level and at the policy-
making level. The interactive approach presented con-
trasts with the kind of data presentation that typically
is made, of which we saw an example in Table 1.
A visual database, such as the one described, could
be populated by importing data from existing error
databases that have been coded using existing alpha-
numeric taxonomies. In our alphatest, we were able to
manually translate a small number of events into the
visual format. However, for the concept to be useful,
it will be necessary to create crossmaps from these
taxonomies to the visual taxonomy so that the data can
be accessed in the visual format without any manual
recoding. Our experience with the ASIPS taxonomy
suggests that this is feasible.
In addition, it will be necessary to create visual
models of other microsystems and, because of wide
variations in systems used, it will be important for the
models to be adaptable by users so that the approach
can be used across a variety of healthcare settings and
internationally. In addition, to facilitate use at the
point of care, the error database should be accessible
directly from within electronic medical record systems.
The ability to view a macro- or microsystem dia-
gram together with error frequency information can
be very valuable in helping decision makers at various
levels in the healthcare system to identify and prioritise
areas for system improvement. Similarly, the ability to
summarise a single event, including errors, contribu-
ting factors, and consequences, in a clear visual for-
mat, would appear to provide some advantages when
compared to a list of codes (see Table 1). For example,
the visual format could facilitate the sharing of infor-
mation with team members and other stakeholders
(including patients and families) and has the potential
to enhance the understanding of events, facilitating
the development of appropriate preventive strategies.
While tracking rates of errors over time or com-
paring rates between diﬀerent institutions or regions
are commonly perceived aims of error reporting
systems, caution is needed in interpreting such data
because of the problemof under-reporting. According
to IOM estimates, only about 5% of known errors are
reported.7 Therefore, diﬀerences in rates of errors
reported over time or between institutions do not
necessarily reﬂect true diﬀerences in rates of errors,
but may merely represent diﬀerences in reporting
behaviour. Similarly, and perhaps even more import-
antly, those errors that are reported most frequently
are not necessarily themost frequent errors that occur;
they are merely the ones that reporters feel more
comfortable reporting. It is hoped that creating more
user-friendly and intuitive reporting tools will help
to increase rates of reporting so that there are more
opportunities to learn. The visual approach presented
in this paper also has the potential to provide a format
for reporting that could, if implemented appropri-
ately, help to facilitate the reporting process and could
directly populate a visual database. Further work is
needed to explore this area.
R Singh, W Pace, S Singh et al228
However, it should be remembered that while im-
proved systems for reporting and dissemination of
error data can be helpful, they will not succeed unless
there is a simultaneous shift towards a culture of safety
that encourages reporting and learning from errors
and eliminates blame and punishment for errors that
are due to systemic problems. It is hoped that using
visualmodels such as those describedwill help to focus
attention appropriately on systems and away from
individual blame and thereby contribute to the devel-
opment of this culture.
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